Discourses on rights, duties and obligations predominantly take place within the context of constitutional, administrative and human rights law. In the last decade these debates have also begun to take place in international investment law, an "autonomous branch" of international law. The main debate centres on the adequacy and sustainability of investor-centred regulatory regimes which provide more rights than obligations to investors. The 2006 Southern African Development Community Finance and Investment Protocol (SADC FIP) was a typical example of such a regime. It offered antiquated protections which were characteristic of first generation Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). The result was that some countries, such as South Africa, opted not to conform to this binding instrument, which did not match their progressive vision of foreign investment. It is against this backdrop that the SADC FIP was recently amended. The amendment, balances the rights and obligations of investors and state parties to some degree, and moves towards sustainable foreign investment. However, this paper argues that more still needs to be done to modernise the document in line with more recent trends.
Introduction
The end of the Second World War (WW2) paved the way for a new era built on the principle of international co-operation. 1 Over time this co-operation would take specific forms such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Coal and Steel Community (the modern-day European Union). 2 On the legal front, international law evolved from functioning mainly as a tool for mutual deterrence to an instrument promoting co-operation and coordination. 3 In the context of international trade, apart from the emergence of new global governance institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), this era witnessed the signing of treaties such as the
General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
Among the more prominent agreements to grace the international trade scene are regional trade agreements (RTAs). Some RTAs are special in that they not only deal with the issue of integrating trade, but they also cover investment regulation. 4 This is important because of the symbiotic relationship between trade and investment. 5 As these instruments address key issues, they have multiplied across the globe.
In Southern Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is the most prominent regional organisation. This organisation was developed in terms of the Southern African Development Community Treaty (SADC Treaty), with the purpose inter-alia of promoting the free flow of capital through improving the investment climate and enhancing cooperation. 6 T KONDO PER / PELJ 2017 (20) 4 The content of these investment policies is equally vital. This is because most investment provisions are biased in favour of the investor and restrict policy space for the host-state. 10 This is especially true in the case of first generation BITs, which provide for investor protection without investor obligations and also lack policy space for the host-state. 11 The effect of this in some cases is that the host state is exposed to large claims when it attempts to implement domestic measures in conflict with the biased investment provisions. 12 The 2006 SADC FIP was based on first-generation BITs which have outlived their usefulness. These BITs provide more investor rights than they provide investor obligations or the rights of the state. The effect was that the 2006 SADC FIP contained less policy space for domestic states. In recent times the need for policy space has taken centre stage. Many countries such as South Africa, India and Australia are now focussing on having socially responsive investment regimes which can advance the agenda of sustainable development. 13 The SADC FIP had been lacking in this regard, to a degree.
While the 2006 SADC FIP provided for enlightened clauses such as corporate responsibility, the optimal use of national resources, environmental measures and the right to regulate, this had still been far from what is anticipated in newer international investment agreements (IIAs). As an example, the Southern African Development Community Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (SADC Model BIT) also includes more progressive provisions such as the right of the state to pursue developmental goals 14 and the minimum standards for human rights, the environment and labour. 15 Although the 2006 SADC FIP touched on some of these concepts, they 10 Grear and Kotzé Research Handbook on Human Rights and the Environment 493.
11
Skovgaard Poulsen Bounded Rationality and Economic Diplomacy 89. 12 Up to 2014, a total of 608 cases had been brought for investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). Of these 43% were decided in favour of the host state, 31% in favour of the investor and 27% were settled. See EFILA 2015 http://efila.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/05/EFILA_in_response_to_the-criticism_of_ISDS_final_draft.pdf.
13
South Africa has enacted the Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015, which is expected to come into force towards the end of 2017. It has also served notices to terminate most of its existing BITs. India is also moving to terminate its existing BITs and has already sent notifications to this effect. For those treaties that are expiring, India has requested the other parties to renegotiate so as to clarify existing ambiguities. India also released a new Model BIT in 2015, which will serve as the basis for future negotiations. Australia has made a hard exit out of the ISDS system. All future BITs and RTIAs it engages in will no longer include investor-state arbitration.
T KONDO PER / PELJ 2017 (20) 5 were not put forward expressly. 16 It provided generic rights and obligations as opposed to future-looking balanced rights and obligations.
As a result, some states (such as South Africa) chose to apply the SADC Model BIT in the development of their domestic laws, despite their constitutional and international obligations to honour the commitments in the SADC FIP. Woolfery asserts that the 2006 SADC FIP was inconsistent with the more favourable SADC Model BIT. 17 This was because, as discussed earlier, it contained a number of BIT-style provisions which were inconsistent with the SADC Model BIT. 18 For instance, the SADC Model BIT recommends against the inclusion of a provision on fair and equitable treatment and opts instead for an alternative formulation of the provision on fair administrative treatment, if it is deemed necessary to include this clause. 19 Further to the above, Member States were unclear about their commitments derived from the SADC FIP and their legal implications. According to the SADC FIP Baseline Project Report prepared by the Finmark Trust, only 53.4% of the country-level commitments of the FIP had been realised. 20 As a result of the challenges of the 2006 SADC FIP, there was therefore a need to amend the document. 21 A new SADC FIP was tabled to the Council of Ministers and adopted on the 14 th of August 2015. The parties signed to these changes on the 31 st of August 2016. 22 This document is now in force but was released to the public only on the 16 th of May 2017. 23 16 See the commentary on art 21 of the SADC FIP.
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Woolfrey 2014 https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/5358-is-an-overhaul-ofthe-sadc-protocol-on-finance-and-investment-imminent.html.
18
19
Article 5 of the SADC Model BIT. 20 SADC, GIZ and Finmark Trust 2011 http://www.finmark.org.za/sites//wpcontent/uploads/pubs/Broch_FIP0312.pdf. Of the remaining percentage, 8.4% represents commitments in the process of being realised, while the rest remains unrealised. It is important to note the disclaimer that this study is based on desktop research.
21
The new FIP was tabled to the Council of Ministers at the end of 2015. The new FIP contains newer trends such as state-state arbitration and moves away from the problematic provisions in the old FIP, which were based on old-generation BITs. See Trade and Investment Parliamentary Committee 2015 http://pmg-assets.s3-websiteeu-west-1.amazonaws.com/150922Summary_of_Matrix.pdf.
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The amendments required the adoption by three-quarters of the Member States that are a party to the SADC FIP. Such adoption has already taken place. This information was supplied and confirmed in an email by Shubi Mukarasi and Thembi Langa from the SADC. The next section of this article critically assesses the differences between the 2006 SADC FIP and the 2015 SADC FIP. In doing so, the positives and short-comings of such changes are discussed. As will be noted in that section, many of the changes were those proposed by South Africa. 
Investor rights post-establishment

Treatment
Non-discrimination has become one of the key protections afforded to investors in the treaty system. The general thrust of this principle is that states cannot discriminate among investors on the basis of their nationality. 52 In international investment law, non-discrimination is often exemplified in the national treatment and most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment standards. 53 These treatment standards will now be discussed.
A standard provision of MFN treatment was provided for in the 2006 SADC FIP. 54 It stated that foreign investors may be afforded no less favourable treatment than that which is accorded investors of any other third state. 55 The practical consequence of the clause was that it placed investors from different countries in a host state on the same level. This is, however, ) focuses on, but is not limited to: "increasing the number of black people that manage, own and control enterprises and productive assets; facilitating ownership and management of enterprises and productive assets by communities, workers, cooperatives and other collective enterprises; human resource and skills development; achieving representation in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce; preferential procurement and investment in enterprises that are owned or managed by black people". See s 1 of the BEE Act. In addition, the provision also draws from Article 4 of the SADC Model BIT on non-discrimination.
Investor protection
The protection standards in IIAs are perhaps the standards most keenly followed by foreign investors. The reason for this is that investors want to ascertain how much protection is available to their investments. 78 As a result, this section details the various protections that are contained in the 2016 SADC FIP. These are compared with previous protections under the 2006 SADC FIP and discussed under the following headings: (1) expropriation and compensation (2) fair and equitable treatment and (3) the repatriation of funds and transfer of profits.
Expropriation and compensation
The right to expropriate in customary international law is a jealously guarded right. 79 Generally, such expropriation should take place in the interest of the public or for a public purpose. As noted by Brown, the universal view under customary international law is that:
For expropriation to be lawful, the taking must be made in the public interest, on a non-discriminatory basis, under due process of law, and provision must be made for prompt, effective and adequate compensation. 80 Over time, this universal view developed into the "Hull doctrine" after a letter by Cordell Hull, the then Secretary of State of the United States of America, 81 to Mexico, detailing that it is accepted practice that expropriation must be followed by the payment of "prompt, effective and adequate compensation". 82 Such compensation had to be complete and paid at a market value. 83 Investments shall not be nationalised or expropriated in the territory of any State party except for a public purpose, under due process of the law, on a non-discriminatory basis and subject to the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. 86 The approach taken by the 2006 SADC FIP with respect to expropriation was consistent with the property clauses in domestic constitutions as well as expropriation clauses in the current BITs of the Member States.
For instance, the new Zimbabwean Constitution provides in section 71(3) that persons may be compulsorily deprived of their property only if the deprivation is done: "in terms of law of general application; in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health or town and country planning; or in order to develop or use that or any other property for a purpose beneficial to the community". 87 Furthermore, section 71(3)(c) requires the acquiring authority to give reasonable notice, pay fair and adequate compensation before acquiring the property or within a reasonable time after the acquisition, and approach a competent court for a confirmation order 30 days before or after the property was acquired, if the acquisition is disputed.
The South African Constitution, as another example, provides in section 25 that no persons may be arbitrarily deprived of their property unless in terms of law of general application. 88 When such a law is followed, this must be for a public purpose or in the public interest and subject to the payment of compensation determined by the affected parties or a court of law. Further, the "amount of compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interests of those affected and all the relevant circumstances". In both examples, despite the variable language used, expropriation must be done in accordance with law of general application. In addition, it must be for a public purpose or in the public interest, and prompt, effective and adequate compensation must be given. While the expropriation clause in the 2006 SADC FIP covered a fair number of the important issues regarding expropriation despite its brevity, more detail could have been given.
The 2016 SADC FIP deals with expropriation and nationalisation in more detail and in a slightly different manner. 90 Firstly, in terms of compensation, the 2016 SADC FIP does not utilise the Hull formula (fair, prompt and adequate compensation). Instead it provides that expropriation or nationalisation should be done subject to the payment of fair and adequate compensation. This is in line with the formulation in Article 6(1) of the SADC Model BIT. The provision then goes on to clarify the determination of fair and adequate compensation. It notes that:
Fair and adequate compensation shall be assessed in relation to the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took place ("date of expropriation") and shall not reflect any change in value occurring because the intended expropriation had become known earlier. However, where appropriate, the assessment of fair and adequate compensation shall be based on an equitable balance between the public interest and the interest of those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances and taking account of:
(a) the current and past use of the property; (b) the history of its acquisition; (c) the fair market value of the investment; (d) the purpose of the expropriation; (e) the extent of the previous profit made by the foreign investor through the investment; and (f) the duration of the investment. BIT and section 25(3) of the South African Constitution reveals that the former is derived from the latter. This is in line with option 1 for Article 6(2) of the SADC Model BIT. This approach reflects a sober and more balanced approach to determining compensation because it strikes a balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected. The reason for this is that while there is a presumption that the fair market value will be used, a state can still rebut this presumption on the basis of the equitable criteria set out in the provision. 92 Second, the 2016 SADC FIP provides for the manner in which the compensation must be given. It states that the payment shall be made in a freely convertible currency in accordance with the applicable law of the host state. 93 Third, the investor is given a right under domestic law to challenge the expropriation or the valuation of the compensation awarded. 94 This can be done by means of a judicial review or by means of an independent authority. This ensures that an investor's rights to fair administrative action are realised. 95 Fourth, and more interestingly, the 2016 SADC FIP notes that where a payment is significantly burdensome on a host state, such a state may pay the amount due yearly over a 3-year period. 96 Alternatively, the investor and the host state may agree on a suitable period and interest rate. 97 The option to stagger the payment for expropriation or nationalisation is crucial in the developing country context, where resources may not always be available to immediately provide for compensation.
Lastly, the 2016 SADC FIP addresses the issue of indirect expropriation. It provides that where the host state undertakes a measure of general application "that is designed and applied to protect and enhance legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, it shall not constitute indirect expropriation". This is important because it reinforces the crucial right to regulate, which will be discussed in a later section. Furthermore, it protects the host state from frivolous and litigious suits related to the indirect expropriation of investments owing to a domestic A number of options were available for resolving the challenges brought about by the fair and equitable treatment standard. These included: (1) linking the fair and equitable standard to customary international or the international minimum standard, (2) providing an exhaustive list of obligations related to fair and equitable treatment, (3) completely eliminating the standard of fair and equitable treatment from the treaty, and (4) providing an alternative formulation of the fair and equitable treatment such as fair administrative treatment. 107
To analyse: the first option is rendered impractical because of the refusal of arbitral tribunals to recognise efforts to limit the interpretation of the standard in cases such as the Railroad Development Corp v Guatemala. 108 Similarly, the third option is hamstrung by the frequent desire of states to include the fair and equitable treatment standard despite its general weaknesses. 109 The fourth option is more practical as it provides a narrower scope. This is the option adopted by South Africa in its Protection of Investment Act. The Drafting Committee of the SADC Model BIT was suitably impressed with this option, as it narrows the scope of the current fair and equitable treatment standard, thereby eliminating the possibility of an expansive interpretation. The challenge with this, however, is the shift in the drafting language from investor rights to governance standards, which drastically lessens the protection that should be granted to an investor according to customary international law. In this regard, the alternative formulation of the fair and equitable treatment standard becomes too narrow. 
The repatriation of funds and transfer of profits
One of the cornerstone principles in foreign investment law is that investments and their profits should be able to be repatriated. 113 Generally, investors are not willing to make investments in a foreign country where they will be unable to repatriate the profits from the operations or the funds for the partial or complete sale of the original investment. 114 The same sentiment is shared by the government of the country of the investor, which also stands to benefit economically from such repatriation. 115 The result is that most investment treaties contain a clause on how capital and funds will be repatriated.
In the light of the above, the 2006 SADC FIP provided for the free movement of capital, subject to restrictions in certain instances. 116 
The rights and obligations of investors and State Parties
The right to regulate
It is trite that a state has the sovereign right to regulate within its borders. This is equally true in the context of international investment law. As noted in ADC v Hungary, a state has an inherent right to regulate, subject to limitations. 119 On the matter of this right Salacuse expressed the opinion that:
With respect to foreign investment, states have the complete legislative jurisdiction to determine to what extent foreign nationals and companies may undertake investments, which sectors and industries they may or may not enter, and whether or not they must fulfil additional conditions in order to undertake and operate an investment within state territory. 120
As is evidenced above, the right to regulate gives host states autonomy to control how investments are regulated within their territories. As a result, this is a highly cherished right in international investment law, one which states will not give up lightly, as it has important implications for national There have been various ways of trying to give meaning to the right to regulate in the public interest. The Preamble of the Protection of Investment Act in South Africa, for instance, provides that the government has a right to regulate in the interests of the public in accordance with the Constitution. While this does little to bring clarity to the meaning and scope of the right to regulate in the public interest, it does provide context as to how the right should be exercised.
Another way is to provide an illustrative list of matters generally deemed as forming part of the right to regulate in the public interest. A good starting point is to observe the matters referred to by Nikièma as forming part of public interest. He notes that "public interest is a broad concept that includes public order, public health, national security, human rights, public morals and environmental protection". 126 However, Titi limits the scope of public interest in the context of the right to regulate. He believes that "the right to regulate in the public interest is understood to encompass regulation with a basis other than a state of necessity, national security or the public order". had to make a determination on indirect expropriation and state regulation for the public purpose of protecting the environment. In reaching a decision, the tribunal noted that despite the fact that the expropriation had been done for the legitimate purpose of regulating to protect the environment, this did not absolve the government from paying compensation. 130 In the words of the Tribunal:
[T]he purpose of protecting the environment for which the Property was taken does not alter the legal character of the taking for which adequate compensation must be paid. The international source of the obligation to protect the environment makes no difference. 131 Therefore, while a state has a right to regulate, the exercise of this right comes with the concomitant responsibility to compensate an affected investor, where such a measure leads to expropriation. 132 It is therefore critical that the right to regulate be read with other provisions such as national treatment or expropriation and compensation.
The 2016 SADC FIP expressly provides for the right to regulate in Article 14. It states that a host state has a "right to regulate in the public interest and to adopt, maintain or enforce any measure that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a manner that is sensitive to health, safety or environmental concerns". The proposal by South Africa was, however, that this provision be redefined. 133 Its view was that the current text had to be replaced by a clearer and more detailed provision. This provision crystallises the right to regulate in the public interest of the state in international law. This provision by virtue of its drafting also eliminates any ambiguity related to the powers of the state to take regulatory measures or otherwise to promote the welfare and interests of its people. This in turn reduces the possibility for litigation. As a result, the 2016 SADC FIP integrates this suggestion verbatim in Article 12(1). Two further subsections were added, however. Article 12(2) reinforces the contents of Article 12(1) by noting that an exercise of the right to regulate should be understood as forming part of the balance of rights and obligations of investors and host states. Article 12(3) notes that non-discriminatory measures taken in order to comply with international obligations under other treaties do not constitute a breach of the 2016 SADC FIP.
Transparency
Notwithstanding its declining use, 135 the transparency clause remains a fundamental feature of the new generations of BITs. 136 It generally provides that the host state must be transparent in its laws, regulations, administrative practices and procedures. 137 To meet this requirement the government must publish its policies in places such as the Government Gazette so as to inform concerned parties of their rights and obligations. 138 The rationale behind these clauses is that " [t] ransparency is a crucial determinant of the political and economic risk foreign investors face when making a foreign investment decision". 139 The difficulty with this approach is that it focuses on the state and its institutions but fails to demand the 
Sustainable development: the optimal use of natural resources and environmental measures
The optimal use of natural resources is a rarely used clause in the treaty system, which accords with the objectives of sustainable development and the preservation of the environment. 142 A typical clause provides that the host state must guarantee that natural resources within its borders are used in a manner that is environmentally friendly and sustainable. Some treaties would generally prefer to canvass these ideas in separate clauses on sustainable development and the environment. optimally utilised. Further revisions should be made to this provision, however, so as to adequately link it to sustainable development.
Key personnel
Key personal provisions in a treaty regulate how a foreign company can fill important vacancies within its structure. 145 This provision is vital in determining how a foreign enterprise will fill key managerial positions as part of its strategic plans. 146 This is because these companies are always looking to bring expatriates in to take up positions requiring special skills. 147 This provision is expressed differently in investment treaties. Some of its forms include entry and sojourn, key personnel, permits, and the sourcing of requisite skills.
Both the 2006 SADC FIP and the 2016 SADC FIP express their clauses on foreign personnel as the "sourcing of requite skills". 148 The provision states that:
State Parties shall, subject to their national laws and regulations, permit investors to engage key personal and other necessary human resources of their choice, regardless of their nationality, under the following circumstances:
(a) where the skills do not exist in the Host State and the Region,
where State Parties are satisfied that the sourcing of such skills will be in compliance with regional policies; and where such sourcing would enhance the development of local capacity through skills transfer. 149 While this provision is partially protectionist, it supports the domestic policies of the Member States. Most countries now seek to ensure that investments benefit their citizens through employment, and as a result, they want to ensure that investors bring in only specialised employees who will transfer their skills to locals. 150 
Corporate responsibility
The clause on CSR has recently surfaced in international investment agreements. 151 In this regard some Model BITs have made specific reference to CSR. 152 These include the 2007 Norway Draft Model BIT, the 2012 Canadian Model BIT, and more recently the 2015 Indian Model BIT and the 2015 Norway Model BIT. To focus on the 2015 Norway model BIT, this document emphasises the importance of CSR in its preamble. 153 Article 31 provides that:
The Parties agree to encourage investors to conduct their investment activities in compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and to participate in the United Nations Global Compact. 154
The CSR clause, therefore, is important in promoting the social, ethical, human rights and environmental obligations of investors beyond their legal and economic duties. 155 This moves away from the current practice of asking for voluntary compliance with CSR standards and imposes a duty of discharging CSR. 156 As argued by Pillay, a CSR clause is vital, particularly for developing countries, as it promotes their "power to regulate to achieve sustainable development". 157
Article 10 of Annex 1 of the 2006 SADC FIP provided for corporate responsibility. It states that "[f]oreign investors shall abide by the laws, regulations, administrative guidelines and policies of the Host State". 158 The language of this provision is retained in the 2016 SADC FIP with reference to investor responsibility. The challenge with this drafting is that it focuses on compliance with domestic laws and procedures but does not require the investor or the investment to comply with international standards or to participate in international bodies, as is required by the CSR clause in the 2015 Norway model BIT, for example. There is therefore a need to clarify the corporate responsibility clause in the SADC FIP so as to shift its emphasis from the current specific compliance with law and policy to a broader and more general compliance. 
General provisions
Exceptions
A small but growing number of international investment agreements, particularly free trade agreements (FTAs), contain exception clauses. 159 In most instances, a treaty will contain an exception clause related to either Article XX of the GATT or Article XIV of the GATS. However, in some cases, a hybrid exception clause is provided. 160 Beyond the differences in formulation, the purpose of these clauses is to increase regulatory flexibility, balance the interests of investors and host states, and enhance legal certainty where disputes arise.
Exceptions in a treaty can be either general or special. General exceptions apply to all the obligations in a treaty, while special exceptions apply to certain obligations only. On the one hand, special exceptions usually focus on national treatment and MFN treatment, while on the other hand, general exceptions cover issues 161 such as human rights, public order, public employment, labour standards, the environment, taxation and security. 162 Recently the trend in international investment agreements has been to include special exceptions. The SADC FIP does not deviate from this norm. The 2016 SADC FIP does not contain an exceptions clause. Neither does it contain an MFN clause or the fair and equitable treatment standard.
Rather, it provides a national treatment clause with built-in exceptions. It provides that host states may grant "preferential treatment to domestic investments and investors in order to achieve national development objectives". 164 These exceptions, as discussed earlier, are crucial to ensuring that the right to regulate is not unnecessarily impeded.
Dispute resolution
With the constant evolution of international investment law, which brings about uncertainty, dispute resolution has become a fundamental area in treaties. Dispute settlement mechanisms permit an investor to initiate proceedings against a host-state in domestic and international forums. 165 Internationally, the fora available to the investor include the International Centre for the Settlement of Disputes (ICSID) and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Each of these institutions has its own rules and arbitral tribunals. 166 Dispute resolution clauses, in particular investor-state arbitration provisions, have been at the centre of much controversy, as they have exposed many developing states to heavy penalties for breaching investment agreements. 167 For example, in 2012 an investor from the USA was awarded almost US$ 1.9 billion for a claim against Ecuador. 168 Tribunal as one of its grounds for non-compliance 176 and exerted political pressure which led to the suspension of the SADC Tribunal. 177 Following this process, the SADC leaders, through the SADC Summit, reviewed the powers of the tribunal, opting for granting it a more limited scope. One may question the efficacy of attempting to rely on an arbitral tribunal that has been branded as illegitimate. It would perhaps be better to err on the side of caution and focus on the UNCITRAL and ICSID tribunals, which are generally viewed as legitimate and competent bodies.
Conclusion
The changes made in the 2016 SADC FIP are commendable to a great degree. In its previous form, it provided antiquated provisions which are typical of first-generation BITs. These provisions failed to balance the rights and obligations of investors and state parties. Furthermore, the provisions exposed host states to onerous investment arbitration claims. The 2016 SADC FIP addresses most of these concerns by drawing from some South African recommendations, the SADC Model BIT, and some international best practices.
The 2016 SADC FIP eliminates problematic clauses such as the fair and equitable treatment clause, which is a "cure it all" remedy for investors, and the MFN clause, which leads to treaty shopping by investors. The 2016 SADC FIP also clarified other provisions such as those on the repatriation of funds and expropriation. There is now greater certainty with regards to these provisions. For example, a proper procedure is laid out for calculating the compensation due to an investor. More importantly, the 2016 SADC FIP introduced a qualified national treatment clause which allows host states to afford preferential treatment to their nationals in line with their developmental objectives. This is vital in the developing country context and it also accords with the constitutional mandates to redress injustices of the past in Member States such as Zimbabwe and South Africa. However, seven issues still need to be addressed, some of these arising from the changes to the 2006 SADC FIP. These relate to: (1) the definition of investors, (2) the omission of the fair and equitable treatment standard, (3) the scope of the transparency clause, (4) the alignment of the optimal use of natural resources clause with sustainable development, (5) the shift away from investor-state arbitration, (6) the expansion of the investor liability clause, and (7) the inclusion of a physical security clause.
The definition of investors
The definition of an investor was narrowed from including any person who has been admitted to make an investment so that it now refers only to "a natural or a juridical person of another State Party, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the State Party in which the investment is made". 178 This limits the protection offered to SADC investors only. This is problematic, given the fact that there are very few intra-SADC investments. Protection is therefore no longer extended to the SADC's main investors. The closed nature of this list eliminates the possibility of a broad interpretation by arbitral tribunals. It also curbs the need for non-compliance by some Member States in an effort to avoid the broad provisions of the standard. 182 Furthermore, it could also be stipulated that the exercise of the right to regulate in the public interest does not constitute a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard. This would further mitigate the risks host states face from broad interpretations of the standard. It would also facilitate transformational policies which could be deemed as violating the fair and equitable treatment standard.
The scope of the transparency clause
With regards to the transparency provision, the recommendation is that in the interest of progressiveness the provision on transparency in the 2016 SADC FIP should be extended to investors and their home states. The alignment of the optimal use of natural resources clause to sustainable development
In terms of the optimal use of natural resources clause, it is recommended that this provision be aligned to sustainable development. This is due to the interconnectedness of sustainable development, environmental measures 184 and the use of natural resources. It is recommended that these clauses be consolidated in one clause on sustainable development, which is an important thrust in modern international investment law. The provision would read that: 185 (a)
State Parties should promote the use of their natural resources in a manner that promotes sustainable development.
(b) More broadly, Member States should take measures to protect the environment, human rights, safety, health and labour rights, pursuant to their right to regulate, the measures of which cannot be relaxed to promote foreign investment.
This provision would clearly articulate the wish of the Member States to use BITs to promote investment, but such development ought to be sustainable.
The shift away from investor-state arbitration
While the shift away from investor-state arbitration eases the concerns of host states with regard to unreasonable arbitral awards, it raises new concerns about the adequacy of the recourse mechanism available to SADC investors. 186 The SADC Tribunal, which is now the main mechanism for resolving investment disputes in the SADC, has in the past failed to enforce its judgements. Furthermore, while investors retain their right to access domestic courts, it is worth noting that domestic courts are subject 184 Article 13 of Annex of the SADC FIP on environmental measures provides that: "State Parties recognise that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures and agree not to waive or derogate from international treaties they have ratified, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from such measures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in their territories of an investment".
185
This provision combines and clarifies arts 12 and 13 of the SADC FIP.
186
It also raises issues about a lack of consistency in the application of the law. to the influence of the host state and can therefore lack impartiality. As a result, the mechanisms for resolving disputes are currently inadequate. The suggestion is that investor-state arbitration be made an option of last resort after all domestic avenues have been exhausted.
Expansion of the investor liability clause (CSR)
Another provision that needs revision is the investor liability clause. While this provision is noble in that it places an obligation on investors to comply with domestic rules and regulations, it is too narrow. The suggestion in this regard is that the clause should be extended to include requiring investors to act in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and to participate in the United Nations Global Compact.
The inclusion of a physical security clause
One final issue that was not addressed in the amendment is the introduction of a full protection and security clause framed as "physical security". Both the 2016 SADC FIP and the 2006 SADC FIP do not include this provision, which is essential to guarantee the protection of intra-SADC investments in times of strife or violence. The failure to include this provision suggests that lesser protection is given to intra-SADC investors than would be given to other investors under BITs. 
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